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Abstract. This paper develops a conceptual framework for ensuring the 
sourcing decisions are compliant with the servitization strategies of 
manufacturing companies. We argue that the choice of a servitization strategy, 
and the development of the PSS offering, should be driven by the customer‟s 
perception about the product‟s complexity and criticality. The sourcing 
decisions to configure the supply network, and the typology of relationships to 
be established with the supplier, should be taken accordingly. 
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1   Introduction 
Previous works dealing with sourcing decisions in service delivery network 
(mainly focused on after-sales and product support services), pointed out the drivers 
influencing the level of vertical integration of the network that provides the product 
service system (PSS). The core of this value chain is the servitized organization (SO), 
usually a manufacturing company, that is responsible for configuration, planning, and 
coordination of the PSS supply network. These drivers are: the service volumes and 
the required level of (in-house) control [1]; the existing sales distribution channel(s) 
[5],[6] and the product substitutability [5]; the product (physical) features [10]; the 
wish to earn direct revenue through product-services [4],[10], the cost of creating 
direct distribution channels, and the required degree of control over customer support 
quality [4]. In particular, supply chain relationships are pointed out to be critical to 
retain the value coming from the customer interactions, and to achieve differentiation. 
Nordin [7] suggests that the more the service offer is strategic and customized, the 
more important is “to retain service processes internally or to align with external 
partners in close relationships”. In such a situation, the “positive bonds” with 
customers can be leveraged to achieve a competitive advantage in the long run. 
According to [3], when the provision of materials and/or services is outsourced, the 
level of integration between the buyer and the supplier can be described by the 
following aspects: 1) the level of information exchange, 2) the operational linkages, 
3) the legal bonds, 4) the cooperative norms and 5) the relation-specific adaptations. 
We adopt these criteria to characterize four different classes of the buyer-supplier 
relationships, as in Table 1. In line with the works from [8], although a continuum of 
buyer-supplier relationships exists between the two extremes (Open Market 
Negotiation and Insourcing), hereinafter we will consider only three intermediate 
configurations: Co-operation, Collaboration and Partnerships. Co-operating firms are 
engaged in medium-term contracts [11]. In this situation, information exchange and 
operations management integration techniques are implemented to increase the 
efficiency of the market transactions. Collaboration is achieved through a more 
structured approach to the buyer-supplier interactions, adopting techniques for 
coordinating common processes, such as just-in-time, and integrating information 
flows. In partnership, along with a higher operational integration, the parties develop 
mutual trust and commitment, enforced by relational investments and asset specificity 
[2]. 
Table 1. Typologies of buyer supplier relationships. 
Characteristics Open Market 
Negotiation 
Co-Operation Collaboration Partnership 
Information Exchange None Low to Medium  Medium to High High 
Operational linkages None to Low Medium to High Medium to High High 
Legal Bonds None None to Low Medium None to High 
Relationship-specific 
adaptations (by the buyer 
or the supplier) 
None 
(manufacturer) 
Low to Medium (in 
case of Captive 
supplier) 
None to Medium (None 
or Low for the 
manufacturer, Low to 
medium for the supplier) 
Low to High 
(Low to Medium for 
the manufacturer, 
Medium to High for 
the supplier) 
Medium to 
High 
Cooperative Norms Very low Low Medium High 
2   Linking servitization strategy to sourcing decisions 
In this section we present the supply network structure and the typology of buyer-
supplier relationship that company should establish in order to deliver different 
typology of PSS. In doing so we will refer to the framework proposed by Rapaccini et 
al. [9] which identifies the typology of PSS that company should offer based on two 
main drivers: the product complexity and criticality. Referring to the quadrant I of 
figure 1 (adapted from [9]), the customer expectations in terms of services are low; as 
a result, the product-service sourcing decision should aim at reducing the product-
service delivery costs at their minimum. Since products are perceived as simple, the 
SO can easily find providers for both SPU and SPF services, and make use of its 
bargaining power to reduce the delivery costs. The financial benefits of outsourcing 
are particularly relevant in case the installed base of products is widely spread over 
large territories. In such a situation, the cost of providing, directly, decent fix & repair 
services can be very high, especially if compared with the benefits that this provision 
can generate for both the SO and the customers. As result, outsource to small local 
providers, located close to the customers, turns out to be a cost-effective decision. 
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Fig. 1. A framework for configuring the PSS supply network. 
In this case, the buyer-supplier relationship is, basically, based on an open-market 
negotiation, with a minor exchange of information (e.g. interventions performed 
under the warranty period, spare parts used, etc.). In such a situation, the service 
provider will serve more than one SO, in order to obtain scale and scope economies 
and make its business sustainable. As a result, he/she will not be willing to sign 
exclusivity agreements with the SO. In quadrant II, each product in the installed base 
is a potential cash-generator unit. However, the product criticality makes customer 
very demanding in terms of product availability (and thus, in terms of delivery time). 
In addition, the perceived (low) product complexity makes the customers uninterested 
in interacting with the SO. As a result, customers are basically interested in having 
SPF timely and effectively delivered when needed. In these cases, the SO could likely 
provide basic SPU on its own. However, setting up a totally owned network to meet 
customers‟ requirements, can be very expensive, especially in case of very large 
customer bases. Here again, the decision to outsource the service delivery to local 
third parties seems to be reasonable. Being the product simple and the provision of 
SPF services profitable, it is not too complex to find a supplier able to satisfy the 
customer need. These third parties, on the one hand, become suppliers of the SO, in 
the sense that they deliver service to the product end users, on behalf of the SO itself. 
But, on the other hand, they act as customers, since they buy spares and consumables. 
Hence, even the service provider network becomes a cash generator for the SO. By 
setting up such a supply network, the SO creates a captive market, and, at the same 
time, meets the customer requirements. The profits for the provision of the PSS will 
be shared among the SO and the other parties of the supply network. In such a 
negotiation, however, the SO can rely on a higher bargaining power. It is worth to 
point out that, since SPF services are product-related services, the SO (which has 
engineered and manufactured the product) has a very good knowledge about the 
content and the cost/time required to provide the services. As a consequence, he/she 
can efficiently control the service provider even in absence of a hierarchal 
relationship. The relationships between the SO and the service provider, in this case, 
can be effectively described as a co-operation. A moderate information exchange is 
required, and pertains, for example, to the technical documentation update, or to the 
inventory control of spare parts. Operational linkages should be established via 
enterprise information systems, to enable an effective exchange of the aforesaid 
information, to optimize the inventory, the distribution, the shortage and obsolescence 
of spares, in order to reduce the logistic costs for the whole supply network. This, in 
turns, may require specific adaptations on the supplier side, to become compliant with 
the standards imposed by the SO. In this case, the legal bonds are represented by 
agreements that fix the territory to cover and the performance to assure. The most 
critical aspect in this kind of relationships is to establish trust, cooperative norms, in 
fact, are not to be taken for granted. The difference in bargaining power, in fact, can 
encourage opportunistic behaviours on the SO side, which could try to retain most of 
the profits, just increasing the price charged to the supplier for the sales of spare parts 
and consumables. That could determine dissatisfaction on the supplier side, that can 
result in a deterioration of the service performance and, eventually, in dissatisfaction 
of the final customer. In the same fashion, opportunistic behaviour may emerge in 
case the SO is “hostage” of the only supplier available to deliver services in a certain 
area. It usually results in a delay in the service delivery and in an exaggerated 
consumption of spare parts. In this case, incentives and effective control systems are 
required to align the objectives of the supply network. In quadrant III, the SO needs to 
provide, in addition to basic SPF, also SPU services that will have a major impact on 
the customer satisfaction. The provision of SPU services, however, represents a 
complex task. In fact, on the one hand, a manufacturer usually does not have the 
experience, the competences and the technologies to provide customer-care services, 
whose direct recipient is a person. On the other hand, because of the customer 
unwillingness to pay, these services do not ensure any short-term return. Therefore, 
the SO has to choose between investing money in acquiring/crafting the resources to 
provide SPU services or, finding a specialized supplier to whom outsource them. 
Even in the latter case, a major effort is required to identify the supplier and to set-up 
a relationship, especially when the product complexity is caused by the technological 
contents. Consequently, the outsourcing of these services requires a lot of interactions 
between the SO and the supplier. Their relationship should be seen as a long-term 
collaboration, characterized by a consistent information exchange. On one direction 
(SO to supplier) a large amount of technical information have to be provided to make 
it possible for the supplier‟s personnel, to provide remote technical support to 
customers. On the other direction (supplier to SO) information pertaining the most 
recurring issues and customer complaints have to be fed back to support product 
improvement. Obviously, this requires consistent operational linkages that, in turn, 
will require relationship specific adaptations (e.g. dedicate personnel of the supplier to 
handle only the technical requests of SO‟s customers). These relationship-specific 
investments, on the one side, may require the deployment of complex legal contracts 
that make opportunistic behaviour less likely to occur. In quadrant III, manufactures 
need to provide basic fix and repair services as well. Here, again, the cost of 
providing these services internally, especially for companies with large installed base, 
can be overwhelming. Thus, SO are encouraged to outsource the provision of SPF 
services to big, specialized, multimandatary suppliers that can leverage scale and 
scope economy to make the provision of these services economically sustainable. In 
this case, the provider of SPF services could be the same that provides SPU services. 
Finally, in quadrant IV, services represent a very important part of the company value 
proposition. As a result, a full outsourcing of these strategic activities is not advisable, 
since it would undermine the company competitive edge in the long run. However, if 
the SO requires to rely on a supplier for some specialized services (e.g. remote 
monitoring and diagnosis), then it should establish some sort of strategic partnership, 
in certain cases even based on equity. Such a partnership should prevent the supplier 
to leverage the experience carried out with the SO and its customers to become a 
provider of competitors of the SO. On the contrary, the SO and its partners should 
leverage their relationship to provide services even to the competitors‟ customers. 
2   The case studies 
We have use case-based research to try to validate our framework. Cases have been 
selected among the companies participating in the ASAP Service Management Forum 
(www.asapsmf.org). Data were collected through face-to-face or telephone interviews 
with managers, as well as through public sources (annual reports, internet sites, etc.) 
and presentations given in workshops. We have used pseudonyms to preserve the 
anonymity of the companies. A summary of the cases is presented below. 
Company I is an Italian based multinational company producing heating tubular 
steel radiators and design radiators. It employs 1200 people and has a turnover of 250 
million €. Company I owns four production facilities located Europe and Asia and 
three trade branches in Europe. Its products are perceived as extremely simple and not 
critical. Final customers need to interact with the vendor only in case of product 
failure. Failures, however, given the low technological content of the product, hardly 
ever happens (even if the product working lifetime is longer than 20 years). The 
product-service offered is, therefore, limited to: i) substitution or repair services under 
the warranty period; ii) product disposal, as required by law; iii) call center services. 
Hence, the PSS offered is just a core PSS. In order to deliver it to its huge and 
geographically sparse customers‟ base, Company I outsources the service provision to 
a network of almost 500 multimandatary service providers. The relationship with 
these providers is transactional in nature, characterized by a very modest exchange of 
information and almost no operational linkages. Information are exchanged by email 
or fax. In addition, no financial and/or marketing objectives are assigned to the 
service provider, and their performances are not monitored at all. The buyer-supplier 
relationships are characterized by no mutual adaptations. In addition, Company I 
esteems that around the 20% of the interventions under warranty are performed by 
unauthorized providers, but does not perceive it as a serious threat. 
Company II is an Italian-based corporation operating in the HVAC industry that 
employs, worldwide, 7200 people and has a turnover of 1,2 billion €. Company II 
manufactures its products (boilers, water heaters, solar thermal, heat pumps, air 
conditioners, burners) in 18 different facilities, located in 10 countries. Products are 
sold with 5 different brands in 150 countries, by means of 41 commercial branches. In 
this paper, however, we will focus only on the Italian market, which accounts for the 
16% of the worldwide turnover. Products are perceived by final customer as critical, 
but rather simple to operate. As a matter of the fact, customers need to interact with 
the company only when the product has to be installed and/or in case it needs some 
maintenance. Coherently with these perceptions the product-services that Company II 
attaches to its products are: i) installation, maintenance and repair services, all of them 
delivered at customer site; ii) toll free call center service to collect service requests. 
The PSS offered is, therefore, a typical functional oriented PSS. However, its 
delivery represents a complex task. The average product working lifetime is up to 10 
years, the installed base (in Italy) is made of 1.100.000 units and increases of 100.000 
units per year. This gives rise to almost 110.000 intervention request per year, and to 
the need of handling more than 40.000 items of spare parts. The Mean Time To 
Repair expected by customers ranges from 2 hours to 36 hours. In order to meet these 
expectations, Company II chose to outsource the service delivery to a supply network 
made of almost 3000 multimandatary Technical Assistance Centers (TACs). The 
relationship crafted between the Company II and its TACs can be defined as a co-
operation. The information exchange pertains, in one direction (TACs to company) 
the orders of spares, the direct costs (materials and labour) sustained to perform 
interventions under warranty, that will be subsequently refunded by the company. On 
the other direction, (company to TACs), it pertains the transfer/update of technical 
information about new product releases, and, in case, the emerging of recurring 
issues. Such a technical update takes place, on average, 2/3 times every year. The 
provision of spare parts is fully automated: orders can be triggered directly from the 
company‟s web-site (which happens 90% of the times) and are fulfilled in one 
business day. Since TACs are multimandatary, neither thigh legal bonds nor 
significant relationship-specific investments characterize the buyer-supplier 
relationship. Such a relationship, instead, is characterized by a certain conflict of 
interest; in fact, almost the 6% of the company‟ turnover comes from the sales of 
spares, thus TACs are seen as both a third-party service provider and a cash 
generating unit to exploit. In order to avoid unsatisfactory TACs performance and, as 
a consequence, a deterioration of the final customer satisfaction, Company II 
performs extensive customer satisfaction surveys. 
Company III is the Italian branch of a leading multinational Asian corporation. It 
employs 300 people and has a turnover of about 600 million €, made through the 
indirect distribution (recurring to general trade) of consumer electronics, such as 
audio-video devices, laptops, digital cameras and recording systems. Products are 
mostly perceived as non-critical by customers, with the partial exception of mobile 
phones or laptops for professional users. Having a significant technological and 
innovation content, however, the perceived product complexity is quite high. In brief, 
services have to be considered an extension of the product offer, rather than the core 
of the PSS, and are based on: i) web-enabled self-service SPF, such as user manuals, 
technical information, and drivers - all downloadable from the company website; ii) 
field support services, provided through a network of third-party suppliers on the 
territory; iii) end-user oriented services supporting the product usage (SPU) offered 
on the web (such as FAQs, technical support forums, etc.) and through a contact 
centre. Capabilities for service provision are, as well, acquired externally, resorting to 
180 small suppliers of field-services. In addition, a supplier of customer-care services 
is used for the contact centre. Lacking a direct contact with its customer, the contact 
centre‟s interactions turn out to be relevant to match customer‟s expectations, 
differentiate the brand, increase satisfaction and repurchase intentions. Therefore, a 
supplier able to provide state-of-the-art customer care services was strongly needed. 
The company chose a global provider of business process outsourcing solutions in 
high tech industries; in Italy, this provider has two sites and employs around 650 
people. The relationship crafted between the two parties is long-term oriented and can 
be defined as a collaboration. High attention is given to performance management and 
operating systems. Critical aspects were the definition of the Service Level 
Agreement, the definition of KPIs and the establishment of monthly meetings to 
discuss specific cases, compelling issues, to find causes and solutions and so forth. 
Pricing is based on the volumes managed by the supplier, and moderated by the gap 
between the expected vs. the actual performance. The supplier guarantees the 
attainment of a threshold value, while bonuses can be reached with superior 
performance. The information exchange is considered vital by both parties: the 
supplier receives forecasts of the volumes for the service demand, information and 
product variations, promotions and technical training, while company III receives the 
feedbacks on customer satisfaction, complain rates and their causes. In term of 
relation-specific adaptations, a team of professionals from the supplier is dedicated 
exclusively to the helpdesk of Company III, while Company III provides technical 
training to the team. 
Company IV is an European manufacturer of white goods, such as dishwashers, 
washing machines and refrigerators, and of appliances for professional markets, such 
as laundry equipments and disinfection equipments for surgery. Product quality and 
reliability are the main values, which are transmitted to customers. The Italian branch 
employs 150 people and distributes professional and household appliances, reaching a 
turnover of about 100 million €. The professional customers are mainly in the 
HORECA sector (hotel, restoration and catering), self service laundries, and hospitals. 
Professional washing (and drying) machines are the most important product category, 
making around 70% of the professional business revenues. Today, the company 
philosophy is based on three pillars: i) continuous improvement of products, through 
technological innovation and environmental consciousness; ii) “A customer is 
forever” approach, based on product and service quality, listening and satisfying 
customer requirements; iii) crafting partnerships downstream the value chain, to 
explore different businesses and enable new service delivery channels. Therefore, 
from the early 2000s the company shifted from offering professional appliances plus 
basic services, towards offering a solution oriented PSS. In particular, in the self-
service laundry equipment business, the PSS offer encompasses a wide set of 
services, ranging from the supply of professional washing machines and dryers, to the 
layout design, the sales of branded detergents, training programs, full-risk 
maintenance contracts, etc. Moreover, a “tutor” is assigned to each entrepreneur 
opening self service laundry. The tutor acts as a key account and supports the 
entrepreneur also in managerial decisions. The aim is to provide the start-up of a 
business with turn-key solutions, designing the laundry layout, supplying appliances, 
detergents and monitoring systems, training and tutoring people with consultancies. In 
order to deliver this offer, company IV crafted an equity-based partnership with a 
specialized supplier of self-service laundry design and equipments. The two 
companies set up a new company (owned at 25% by Company IV). The branding of 
the new company and the facilities images recall Company IV institutional images 
and colours. 
3   Concluding remarks 
As concluding remarks, it is possible to state that: i) a linkage among the 
servitization strategies (described in terms of PSS provided) and the SO sourcing 
decisions does exist; ii) four different classes of the buyer-supplier relationships can 
be identified (open market negotiation, coordination, co-operation, insourcing / 
partnership). These relationships can be easily described using the Cannon and 
Perrault model [3]; iii) manufacturing companies that servitize to get marketing and 
strategic benefits should consider to (re)structure their service delivery network, in 
order to introduce some higher levels of collaboration and/or partnership with their 
providers. On the contrary, companies that want to obtain (mainly) financial benefits 
from servitization, should outsource the service provision, should establish a co-
operation with the service provider to make the service delivery efficient and should 
use their bargaining power to secure most of the profits coming from service. 
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